Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant,
v.
Richard SYRE, Appellee.
Nov. 10, 1986.
Defendant was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No. 2676 July Term, Kubacki, J., of
tampering with a witness, and defendant appealed. The Superior Court, No. 228
Philadelphia 1982, Cirillo, J., 322 Pa.Super. 416, 469 A.2d 1059, reversed.
Upon remand, 507 Pa. 299, 489 A.2d 1340, the court held that court officer's
comments to jurors violated defendant's fair trial rights. The Supreme Court,
507 Pa. 299, 489 A.2d 1340, reversed and remanded. On remand, the Superior
Court, 348 Pa.Super. 110, 501 A.2d 671, held there had been improper and
prejudicial communications with jury, and the Commonwealth appealed. The
Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence supported trial court's findings
that no prejudicial communications had occurred between trial court's crier and
the two jurors and thus new trial was not required.
Reversed and judgment of sentence reinstated.
Larsen, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Zappala, J., filed dissenting statement.
West Headnotes
KeyCite this headnote
110 Criminal Law
110XXI Motions for New Trial
110k948 Application for New Trial
110k957 Statements, Affidavits, and Testimony of Jurors
110k957(3) k. Misconduct of Jurors, in General.
Sufficient evidence supported finding that no prejudicial
communications had occurred between trial court's crier and two jurors and thus
new trial for defendant was not required.
**535
*2
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted. Inasmuch as
a determination of the instant appeal is dependent solely upon an assessment of
the record, a decision as to the merits of the appeal is being rendered
concurrently.
The appellee, Richard Syre, a lawyer, was found guilty by a
jury of witness tampering. He appealed his conviction to the Superior Court,
which reversed on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support
the conviction (Opinion by Cirillo, J.). 469 A.2d 1059. An appeal was taken to
this Court, and, finding the evidence to have been clearly sufficient, we
reversed and remanded so that the other grounds asserted in the appeal could be
reviewed by the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Syre, 507 Pa. 299, 489 A.2d 1340
(1985). On remand, the same panel of the Superior Court once more set aside the
conviction and remanded for a new trial (Opinion by Cirillo, J.), holding that
there had been improper and prejudicial communications between two jurors and
the court crier during the course of trial. Commonwealth v. Syre, 348 Pa.Super.
110, 501 A.2d 671 (1985). Once again, the Commonwealth has sought our review. A
review of the record reveals that Superior Court has plainly disregarded the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings that no prejudicial
communications had occurred, and, thus, reversal of Superior
Court's order is required.
Upon learning from an alternate juror, one Idolo Capriotti,
that the trial court's crier, Helen Wolf, had communicated with two members of
the jury during trial, appellee requested a hearing on the matter. At the
hearing, Capriotti *3
testified that he had been told during the trial by Barbara
Guarracino (juror # 8) that Wolf advised her that if she listened to certain
taped conversations, which were the Commonwealth's chief evidence, it should
only take five minutes to reach a guilty verdict; and by Amy Eskild (juror ##
11) that Wolf had told her that every person who asks for a jury trial is
guilty. Capriotti's testimony was plainly contradicted, however, by the **536
testimony of Guarracino and Eskild. Both of the latter
testified that the content of their conversations was not as Capriotti had
indicated.
Guarracino testified that she did not recall having had any
conversation with Capriotti that could have been interpreted in the manner that
Capriotti had asserted. Further, Guarracino stated that she had become
depressed during trial because she did not like being separated from contact
with her family, and that, as a result, she had asked Wolf how much longer the
trial would continue. According to Guarracino, Wolf replied that if the jurors
paid attention to the evidence, it should not take them long to decide upon a
verdict. Guarracino testified that Wolf did not indicate what type of verdict
might be reached, and, further, Guarracino stated that her ability to be a fair
and impartial juror had not been influenced in any way by
conversations with Wolf.
Eskild testified that she had initiated a conversation with
Wolf that was merely a broad discussion of the entire jury system, and that, in
the course thereof, they discussed generally the circumstances in which jury
trials are conducted. According to Eskild, Wolf told her that, as a rule, jury
trials are requested by defendants in criminal cases rather than in civil
cases, and that people who are guilty might be one of the types of people that
request jury trials. Eskild testified, however, that she did not recall Wolf
ever having said that every person who asks for a jury trial is guilty. Furthermore,
Eskild stated that her ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror had not
been affected by contact with Wolf.
*4
Finally, Wolf testified that she had in fact had a
conversation with Guarracino in an effort to allay Guarracino's concerns about
being sequestered from her family during trial but stated that, although she
urged Guarracino to be attentive during trial, she did not tell her that the
defendant was guilty or that it should not take long for jurors to reach a
decision in the case. Further, Wolf testified that she had never had even a
general discussion with Eskild about the jury system, and stated that she never
had said that persons who request jury trials are guilty.
Based upon this testimony, the trial court found that no
prejudicial
communications had occurred between Wolf and the jurors,
and, thus, that a new trial was not required. See Commonwealth v. Bradley, 501
Pa. 25, 459 A.2d 733 (1983) (new trial required only where communications
incurred a reasonable likelihood of prejudice). It is established that, in
reviewing a trial court's findings as to whether prejudicial communications
have occurred, an appellate court is limited to a determination of whether the
trial court's findings are supported by the record. See Commonwealth v. Silver,
499 Pa. 228, 241-242, 452 A.2d 1328, 1334-1335 (1982). The testimony in the
present case, as heretofore recounted, supplied an ample basis for the trial
court's findings. Superior Court's decision overruling those findings must,
therefore, be reversed.
Order reversed, and judgment of sentence reinstated.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting statement and would hear
argument.
LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent and in support thereof cite the Superior Court
opinion filed in this case authored by Judge Vincent A. Cirillo, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v.
Richard Syre, 348 Pa.Super. 110, 501 A.2d 671 (1985).
*5
ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. I would afford counsel the opportunity to both
orally present its position and to indicate from the record those factual
matters which would sustain their position.
Pa.,1986.
Com. v. Syre
518 A.2d 535, 513 Pa. 1
END OF DOCUMENT